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improvement when they occur in reality. 
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spective analysis is emphasized: In order to control human errors, 
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cont. 
May 1985 
Risø National Laboratory, DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark 
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PREFACE 
T h i s r e p o r t i s one o f a s e r i e s b e l o n g i n g t o t h a t p a r t o f t h e 
LIT-1 p r o j e c t concerned w i t h d e f i n i n g , d e v e l o p i n g , e v a l u a t i n g 
and d i s seminat ing a methodology for the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of human 
malfunct ions in t e s t and c a l i b r a t i o n . 
In p r e v i o u s r e p o r t s r e q u i r e m e n t s t o and p r o p o s a l s f o r s e a r c h 
s t r a t e g i e s were g iven (NKA/LIT-1(82)101, Risø-M-2351) and i n c i -
d e n t s r e p o r t e d from n u c l e a r power p l a n t s were s t u d i e d t o g e t 
i n d i c a t i o n s o f how d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f human e r r o r c o u l d be 
c o v e r e d by a n a l y t i c a l p r e d i c t i o n or by r i s k management, r e -
s p e c t i v e l y (NKA/LIT-1(84)107, Risø-M-2470). One s t r a t e g y : Work 
A n a l y s i s , was proposed and s u b j e c t e d to a t r i a l a p p l i c a t i o n 
(NKA/LIT-1(84)408, Studsvik Technical Report NR-85/26). 
In the present report (NKA/LIT-1 (84) 106, Risø-M-2513) a guide i s 
provided for the p r e d i c t i v e method: Work A n a l y s i s , and for p o s t -
i n c i d e n t a n a l y s i s of human malfunct ions . A rather d e t a i l e d l e v e l 
has been found n e c e s s a r y i n order to s e r v e p r a c t i c a l a p p l i -
c a t i o n s : Human m a l f u n c t i o n s , g e n e r a l l y , are d e t e r m i n e d by d e -
t a i l s and t h i s n e c e s s a r i l y w i l l be r e f l e c t e d i n a gu ide f o r 
t h e i r treatment . 
The work was f inanced p a r t i a l l y by the Nordic Board o f M i n i s t e r s 
and the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Primarily, the guide addresses people with a knowledge of the 
technical plant in question and involved in the safety-oriented 
design and improvement of human activities and without a 
particular human factors background. Also the guide addresses 
people involved in probabilistic risk analysis and risk manage-
ment. 
In principle, two main possibilities exist of coping with human 
as well as other kinds of risk contributions: 
1) their pre-identification and elimination, as far as poss-
ible, during the design of a human task and in a pre-con-
struction risk analysis, 
2) to improve or counteract them when they occur in practice. 
The two problems should be considered in coherence and by so 
doing, the following concept has been arrived at: The infor-
mation provided by performing a Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) or an As-operated Safety Analysis Report (ASAR) should be 
used as reference for a closed-loop risk control or Risk 
Management (RM) utilizing post-incident analysis as means of 
feedback of operational experience, this is named "the PRA/RM 
concept". 
The search method "Work Analysis" (WA) and the post-incident 
analysis procedure are intended for fitting into the PRA/RM 
concept and for satisfying its documentation requirements, thus 
offering a unified approach for the treating of risk-related 
human activities in their design and improvement and in 
monitoring malfunctions in their performance: 
Work Analysis is developed for well-defined activities, e.g. 
test and calibration, and is a formalized procedure for the 
pre-identification of relevant human errors leading to a lack 
of task result and/or to immediate effects not covered by the 
lack of task result itself. The method makes possible a 
systematic documentation of risk-related intentions of / rea-
sons for the task design and/or its modifications. 
- 8 -
The problems of quantified assessment of human reliability and 
risk contribution are not discussed: For the WA procedure the 
steps where quantification may be attempted are mentioned and 
some concise criteria for quantification are quoted. 
The post-incident analysis procedure will provide a systematic 
human-oriented description and documentation of incidents in-
volving human malfunctions, also in activities not covered by 
PRA and, therefore, to be controlled by RM. Thus, the post-in-
cident analysis makes possible the systematic feedback for 
monitoring the quality of task performance. 
WA and the post-incident analysis orocedure are based on a 
common description system. This syst ; is explained and so are 
its underlying models and way of reasoning. The important 
properties of the description system are that it enables the 
analyst 
- in post-incident analysis to identify a causally ordered 
chain of descriptors connecting an external cause of the 
human malfunction with an external manifestation of the 
effect of the malfunction through two human-oriented descrip-
tors of a general, not task-specific, kind, 
- in predictive analysis to postulate relevant causally-ordered 
chains of the same kind as above and to generate relevant 
scenaria. 
- to have the chain of descriptors connected with a conven-
tional task description given in equipment-oriented terms. 
Only the main principles for incorporation of the WA into an 
overall plant PRA are described as guided by the PRA/RM 
concept, a detailed treatment will be dependent on actual 
circumstances for PRA and RM. However, one could expect in 
relation to a PRA or an ASAR more complete identification, 
description and documentation of relevant event sequences 
related to human activities by using the WA method as a 
predictive tool and the post-incident analysis as a means of 
feedback of operational experience. 
- 9 - / '° 
In a long-time perspective it could he expected to have 
provided from post-incident analyses a systematic collection 
and classification of information on human performance includ-
ing quantified data for improving the quantified assessment of 
human risk contributions, if such improvement is needed and 
collection of information is feasible. 
- 11 -
1. INTRODUCTION 
Two main possibilities exist of coping with human risk contribu-
tions: 
1) their pre-identification and elimination, as far as poss-
ible, during the design of a human task and in a pre-con-
struction risk analysis, 
2) to improve or counteract them when they occur in practice. 
The two problems should be considered in coherence and by so 
doing, the following concept has been arrived at: The infor-
mation provided by performing a Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) or an As-operated Safety Analysis Report (ASAR) should be 
used as reference for a closed-loop risk control or Risk 
Nanagement (RM) utilizing post-incident analysis as means of 
feedback of operational experience, see Figure 1.1. In the 
following, this will be referred to as "the PRA/RM concept". 
For this concept to operate in practice, the requirements given 
in Figure 1.1 should be fulfilled. For a comprehensive dis-
cussion the reader is referred to ref. 1. 
The search method "Work Analysis" (WA) and the post-incident 
analysis procedure are intended for fitting into the PRA/RM 
concept and for satisfying its documentation requirements. They 
are based on a common system for the description of human 
malfunctions as presented in detail in Appendix A. 
Section 2 describes a post-incident analysis procedure for 
incidents with human malfunctions. In addition to the human 
malfunction descriptors a set of description elements is 
applied for the overall description of an incident in order to 
ensure some uniformity and compatibility when characterizing 
different incidents. Relations between post-incident analysis, 
PRA and RM are described at the end of the section. 
Section 3 firstly relates the Work Analysis method with 
different task types, their analyzability and treatment for the 
control of risk. An overview of the method is given, followed 
by the detailed formalized procedure and the incorporation of 
- 12 -
the method in a PRA is briefly outlined. 
Finally, the problems related with quantification of human risk 
contributions are summarized by quoting some previously stated 
criteria for meaningful quantification. The WA method and, 
particularly, the description system for human malfunctions 
should be considered basic qualitative steps towards more 
meaningful quantification. 
The index is composed with the particular intent of supporting 
the reader in acquiring familiarity with terms, definitions, 
etc. 
- 13 
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Figure 1.1: The information provided by performing a prob-
abilistic Risk Assessment should be used as reference for a 
closed-loop risk control or Risk Management utilizing post-
incident analysis as means of feed-back of operational ex-
perience. 
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2. POST-INCIDENT ANALYSIS 
Emphasis should be given to the procuring of an easily ac-
cessible, condensed, unambiguous verbal description of the 
incident, particularly of the human involvement, these prop-
erties being conserved in re-use of the description at later 
occasions. 
If systematic collection of information from many incidents is 
planned, the descriptors to be used should be selected with 
care for the sake of unambiguous coverage for the intended use 
of such a data collection system. In ref. 3 requirements for 
such a system are discussed and examples of descriptor cat-
egories are presented. 
Clarification of human involvement in incidents is rendered 
increasingly difficult as a function of time elapsed after 
their occurrence. The human-oriented categories described in 
Appendix A should promote such clarification in a systematic 
and impartial manner, e.g. by identifying lacking information 
and planning questions for the impartial procuring of such 
information, ending up with an incident description where the 
causal flow and the mechanisms controlling the event propa-
gation are maintained and can be regenerated from the descrip-
tion. 
Even analyses of single, simple cases are worthwhile as they can 
help identify important typical ingredients of more severe inci-
dents. 
In the following discussion, the reader is supposed to be 
familiar with the way of reasoning presented in Appendix A 
about the background and use of the description system and its 
models. 
In order to secure consistent treatment of human malfunctions 
relative to the total sequence of events involved in an 
incident, it is practical to have some uniformity in the 
description of the incident in total. Fig. 2.1 gives the 
- 16 -
elements of such a description: In the following subsections we 
move from the focal point: the human error and its cause, to 
the activities, in which errors occurred, and finally to the 
event sequence subsequent to the error. 
2.1. The Error and Its Cause 
Errors, to be distinguished from technical failures, are used 
for human malfunctions without taking an attitude towards 
guilt, responsibility, misleading from erroneous instructions 
etc. 
Errors are found by the search for causes: Pragmatic stop-rules 
for the search could be to stop at a point in the causal 
sequence which can be accepted as an explanation of where, if 
needed, efficient means of improvement can be implemented. 
An error can be characterized in human-oriented terms by the 
categories: Internal human malfunction and psychological error 
mechanisms, of the description system in Appendix A. 
The categories are described in detail in Appendix A and 
flow-graph guides for their use are given in Figures 2.4 and 
2.5 for internal malfunction and mechanisms, respectively. 
Causes of errors: directly causally coupTed with and previous 
to an error. 
A cause can be characterized by the category: External cause 
of malfunction, in the description system. The connection with 
the human-oriented categories: "Psychological mechanisms" and 
"internal malfunctions" is described in Appendix A. A 
flow-graph guide for using the category: external causes, is 
given in Fig. 2.3. 
Human factors-oriented influences with the potential of promot-
ing the error, however, not being direct causes, can be 
described by the categories: Situation factors and Factors 
shaping performance , in the description system. Flow-graph 
guides for the use of parts of these categories are given in 
Figures 2.6 and 2.7. 
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Conditions: Circumstances external to the erroneous activity, 
in plant-oriented terms and influencing the error, however, not 
to be considered causes as defined above. Could be stated in 
terms such as the descriptors 10-20 in Fig. 2.1. 
Relations between errors and between errors and their causes 
give rise, during the incident analysis, to questions such as 
- Was the error caused/influenced by previous errors or by 
circumstances/conditions? 
- Was, for the same person, one error leading to subsequent 
errors? 
- Was the error owing to å well-meant, however, due to circum-
stances inappropriate intention? 
2.2. Erroneous Human Activities 
An erroneous activity may directly affect the technical plant 
or may belong to previous phases, e.g. planning or making 
instructions. 
As an example, in Fig. 2.2 are shown activities generally 
related with a test or calibration task. The task directly 
affecting the plant is the box in the center of the figure. 
The activities directly in touch with the plant are in general 
much formalized, i.e. determined by instructions and pro-
cedures. This is possible because the well-defined structure of 
technical systems can be reflected in instructions for their 
handling, the purpose of the instructions is to ensure reliable 
handling. 
The degree of formalization is decreased when we move away from 
these activities, e.g. into phases of planning, design and 
administration of the task in question, these consequently 
being less accessible for the identification of causal se-
quences in post-incident analysis. However, if improvements are 
found necessary, it is important to identify and distinguish 
between activities that are well-structured and hence can be 
"designed for reliability", find other activities, which have to 
be kept reliable by administrative precautions, see subsection 
2.4. 
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A description should be given of the activity directly in-
fluencing plant technical systems and plant physical parts and 
during which the error manifested itself as an abnormal 
influence on the plant. 
Also the activity during which the error was committed should 
be described if this activity is different from that above. 
Further, activities or events intervening the above two types 
of activities may be of interest if studying possibilities for 
improvements, particularly "error recovery points". 
The descriptors L1-L13 for task category in Fig. 2.1 should be 
considered examples. 
Task disturbances: The incident analysis should identify 
whether the error occurred during improvisation due to disturb-
ance of an otherwise well-defined task. The descriptors 21-24 
in Fig. 2.1 for the source of disturbance could be applied. 
2.3. The Effects of Error 
In this paragraph the following terms from Fig. 2.1 are 
defined: 
The error effect 
- loss of task result 
- immediate effect 
- coupling between lost result and immediate effect 
- error effect owing to combination of error and condition 
- multi-effect, potential for multi-effect 
The ultimate effect 
- ultimate effect owing to combination of error effect and 
condition. 
For providing a condensed description of the total event 
sequence subsequent to the error, as a minimum it should be 
mentioned whether the error effect is owing to a combination of 
the error and other independent circumstances and similarly for 
the ultimate effect: whether it was owing to a combination of 
the error effect and other Independent circumstances. 
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An incident could appear as being of minor importance judging 
from its ultimate effect or from combinatorial effects not 
likely to be repeated: Still it is considered important to 
evaluate each element of the event sequence in isolation as an 
indicator of possible weaknesses to be improved. Also depend-
ences and couplings between elements should be considered. 
Effect of error = the manifestation of the abnormal influence 
of the error 
- on the physical plant 
- found when causally backtracking 
- causally near to task 
The effect can be described in terms of category: External 
human malfunction, in the description system of Appendix A. 
The effect can be 
- the consequence of a human activity/task in isolation, i.e. 
without task-external causes or conditions, 
- the combinatorial effect of a human activity and a task-ex-
ternal condition, these in combination leading to the effect. 
For task-external conditions, the descriptors 10-20 in Fig. 
2.1 can be considered plant-related examples. 
The effect can be: 
- Lack of the specified task result (Reliability analysis, as 
part of WA, is concerned with errors leading to this type of 
effect as described in section 3). 
- An immediate effect = an effect contributing to risk in a way 
not related to the lack of task result, but to the specific 
causal effect of an erroneous act during the task/activity. 
(Search for immediate effects, as part of WA, is concerned 
with errors leading to this type of effect as described in 
section 3). The immediate effect can influence a system or 
component related or not related to the task. 
Example 1: During a task a valve should be brought from open 
to closed position. By mistake a different valve 
belonging to an unrelated system is closed 
instead: lack of task result and immediate effect 
in unrelated system. Often in this type of event 
- 20 -
the immediate effect only is significant for the 
event. 
Example 2: Error in calibration task leading to wrong cali-
bration: Task result lacking (usually not of 
importance for the event because the old cali-
bration state would probably be satisfactory) and 
immediate effect (= xhe inappropriate new cali-
bration state of instruments, possibly with less 
margin to safety). 
Coupling between lack of task result and immediate effect can 
lead to particular effects as examplified in the following: 
Example 3: 
FiLLlVt SVJ7*M 
TAWNC SVsrfAi 
Example 4: 
Task in filling system: Closing of valve 1. 
Error: valve 2 is mistaken for valve 1 and 2 is 
closed. 
Lack of task result: valve 1 is not closed. 
Immediate effect in different system: Tapping 
system closed. Basin overflow, due to combination 
of lack of task result and immediate effect. 
During a task a valve should be brought from open 
to closed position. By mistake the valve is left 
half open this leading to an effect on the system 
involved in the task, an effect not covered by the 
specification of the task result: lack of task 
result and an immediate effect related to the 
task. 
- 21 -
Multi-effect: If the activity, during which the error effect 
manifested itself, was repeated on several physical parts of 
the plant, we have a multi-effect. Also it should be mentioned 
explicitly if a case is judged to have significant potential 
for leading to multi-effect. 
Ultimate effect describes the end of the event sequence, e.g. 
in terms of descriptors 1-3 in Fig. 2.1. 
2.4. Post-Incident Analysis: Its Relationship with PRA and RM 
According to the PRA/RM concept mentioned in section 1 the risk 
imposed by an industrial process plant, for instance nuclear 
power plant, is controlled in two ways: Firstly, by a plant 
construction based on a PRA. Secondly, by RM, i.e. admin-
istration of the results and preconditions of the PRA which act 
as requirements for plant construction and operation. In 
addition, through the plant lifetime, the results and precon-
ditions of the PRA serve as references for inspections, tests 
and analyses of operational experience: By post-incident analy-
ses operational experience is compared systematically with the 
reference information provided by the PRA in order to support 
RM decisions serving to maintain the designers' safety design 
targets and to reveal oversights and design errors. For a 
discussion of this and the consequent requirements to the 
analytical methods see ref. 1. 
In accordance with the above PRA/RM concept the following can 
be stated as the main purposes of post-incident analysis, 
particularly for human activities and their risk contributions: 
- To identify and distinguish between: errors in well-struc-
tured activities which have been considered in the plant PRA 
and, therefore, are included in the accepted risk (only the 
frequency of such errors should be supervised ),and: errors 
which are not included in the PRA and therefore have to be 
counteracted by administrative precautions. 
- To ensure that the PRA or ASAR for the plant is updated or 
supplemented by the identification, description and docu-
- 22 -
mentation of significant event sequences not covered by the 
PRA/ASAR, particularly those involving human malfunctions. 
How the above purposes coulc be fulfilled in practice depends 
on circumstances determined by the actual plant PRA/ASAR and RM 
and is outside the scope of the present guide. However, at a 
rather general level questions of the following kinds could be 
asked during the analysis: 
Are the elements of the incident expected occurrences within 
the boundaries of the PRA or outside the boundaries, needing 
initiatives for improving system, operational practice or risk 
analysis? 
How could elements of the incident influence risk, e.g. in the 
following ways: 
- by contributing insignificant increase in a failure frequency 
already covered by postulated random component failures 
- by contributing significant increase in frequency of acci-
dental event chain including break of recovery path 
- by having the potential for contributing causal coupling 
between events otherwise considered independent in the PRA. 
- 23 -
or TASK. 
«» ro z* 
C*>NP iT l »M 
Z»téT*l*UTlM 6 
jo Tø to 
C<MVOlT)«M 
I * / toM»//JATtorJ 
WITH HAIFUNC-
Tfl* Of *7«r«e»« 
Lf*Dl*/6 TO 
PFScMtfTo*S 
1© T» £ 0 
MfVlOUS 
7 
P f » C « « p T o « S Cot/ft ifJ6 
&£T**SeAJ £fFSCTS 
COHOI nors/ 
IM tor* ft/A/AT; ptV 
*iTM EfFfCT 
LfAOllJS T * 
Uå.T7»i«T*r C * 7 -
i>etc/i,*Toøs 
lO To to 
LACK OP 
U17VAATF 
effgcT 
besc*iPT*Ai 
1 T o < 
T 
ttf£CT 
HMFUvCTtoM Ofi efi*»n IN TALK, 
LCADiNO To BfffCroA/^i/iwr 
£>£ic/ttoir& or e*TT6tpiFi or H<J*AH 
MaLFuuertoil txtcatPTioM sxirtM 
Mwtn-crrccT 
OK fiTCHTim 
tot THIS. 
LIST Or EXAMPLE DESCRIPTORS 
U 
u 
u 
L».» 
I * . * 
i*.c 
U . I 
I * 
IT. I 
IT .J 
IT.« 
I f 
M . I 
Id.. ' 
I * . > 
I I . é 
L* 
I f « 
I I I 
I I r 
111 
• * • • •» M «*algn — | N 1 • * • ! • • • *« 
T M * M « w w n w aaatgn an« •aglflaaclan 
ranjrlcotlan 
Installation 
Inaputlsn 
•swratisn 
•Ml tsr in i ; 
Canarsl w f t f t u m i aansilag ana jvagaisn* W —nllar 
svarsti arataa) state 
**aer»iaerjr srsceas central; 
sat a* eweervlear/es*le*r far etfter eesreter er setter* 
M K M n l »r U.» . u . t er U.C 
Cenflgvretlen central In M i r te change I W I fenctlei 
«.g. v*lvt iina-w>, erttaning incleeiag eeae/acejiesl 
O m M M n r i r i i i l l w ef eretea configure«« 
CKenge ef w r m m l . etete e.g. alert. M s * 
Ceereineiien ef tieta. e-f- estrn slat« l« reference er 
ether # M < * * 
• I M P »r net specifies 
r«»i mm »iimum: 
Coi l *« K I I H • • lecetien rar esrk tlflcIcMIag getting 
seme I 
'raseretltn sf remanent ant taala 
teecetien ef in« eetwal laal M celiaretlen eecivllr 
•eetereiten. rceeiel af teele etc. 
naimrnancr an* reeeir IsMificeuen a n . I : 
Ceiling wcaaa la iscetien far •**» (intlvaina gelling 
sennit) 
'rcssrsiien af eeeieaent ax« laal* 
Cccetien af the ectvel Maintenance activity 
Pracaralian, nmttn af laala ale. 
laftt lt i ta 
MMfiiatrana«: maraiKf , rtaarling, alamin« aw. 
Mnagaaafti: rt—vrtt aliataiiaa M wnmrntm 
Oinar mt aavrraa atava 
•a i aiaia«, M I afancaaia 
I - nenaal mpmrmtlm* 
> • arataatlaa fanctian 
3 - karrlar (iMliaHna. ». MeaaacltacM, ralaaaa IKraaan*.) 
a Tha u l l laau »ffret af Uw arnit la Ja l iH ta M an ataact«* 
•ccurraiwa wltnln uw aaawnariaa af rlak analvala. 
* Tha . I t laate affaal »f « • a m i I * * « • » * ta M aatalaa Ma 
Maaaariaa af rlak analraia 
• - anlfl aapvralaar IMnar »ar laai l l l r . eaam ralala« la liMlolaaal 
tmrmn* v i a . I . 
1 • alanl aaaratlam «ma»»aan< ( • » » • • • * • • » . !•••• aanalllaii. 
ptnwtr u ala*«>. 
• - » t l l l l f la»tl I M i r . fll»»afuia«aia»,«a)}ap rlak m» ral ia-
• i l l l y laaaaa). 
* - H l M r l l l i l laa wt l l l t r I m l an« in aaatclan: nan » anvlran-
•ania). 
10 
I I 
I I 
I ] 
•a 
•» 
I f 
I? 
I t 
I * 
fe-
l l 
f t 
f l 
H 
- aMmaan araaarlf af laawuaal a«yiaaan( 
- aaaralfX '"• inaanaan — a l *—* f *r M 
• anraif iH in cannrvailan naaafaaiwrln« anaaa af alanl 
•airaaatlan in 
- plant taannical ayam 
- aaa ar praaalra« 
- aaalfn ar •Mealing af araaasaaaa 
. aainiamma, t ta t , ta l i t rat lan. •Mi f iaat ian, faaal ' . !"•»»«• 
nan 
- training, aaMatlan 
. a n t alannla«. aalM<nlin«, agalniairallan. —lagmwt 
• auwr nat aaaaraa a a m 
• f u l « ! * , ggnaragl aiala af laannlaal aaata* 
• lack af taala. agaiaaant 
- lack af antanai, agara anna 
- aihar laak, trfr, gi f f iaul l acaaaa at«. 
Figure 2 . 1 : Formal event d e s c r i p t i o n , i t s elements and example 
d e s c r i p t o r s . 
lOIHMlIT 
tCWKIMHS 
IIINMflttlM 
Of MWIMMIIS 
IttiMM 
sncit t I M M U N , 
I I I I I I M 
CMCEMIOI Of 
IIS« 
MKIU 
IISIMCIIMS 
MSIH tf TIM MO 
IISIMCIIM 
CllIMtMM Of 
M1MIT IH MCOOOMT • 
SHMIM »SINMIfS 
\ 
-Will!««* tOOIMHI 
oiit root 
IttUCtUMttlM 
Figure 2.2: Activities 
task. 
- 24 -
IKItlf ICltlM If K » 
m t i» tit offuiiM. 
MintMwa m nmim 
T 
SIMI If MMUSIMIM 
i . F I U I M - I I m 
W KCtSSMT: IKOMM 
» M l tf MM 
MfMIti Of I * tMi tt M 
CMftltt Mt 
I 
IIUMIIIM If ItM IHO 
lOM-ttM fUMIMr KHOK 
•urn i m i M o . H K . H M I 
$1111, MBUIIN CMIMl 
I 
HltMllIM Hit CMfML 
or H K S M M U 
I 
CKCOIIM Of IIK II MOfltt * -
SMtl-tlM HMMIM: IITIMtTIM 
» I t IK CMMII IKMTINtl 
Stt« | 
CMICI Of IUI FltSMKL 
I 
•MIMI KMIIS MC MIIIMO/tlMO 
IMIIIIM Of (MIMMI IS 
CtMICO Ml 
i tw is incoi io 
OCSMI Of I t M IS »fftOKO/SIMCD 
ISOUIIM IS eiKULIO 
riLlM Of MCMCIItllM MD 
(IftlilKC. IF KCISSMT: 
tllCIIMM Of MCMHIS 
sttn or 
INlMMt 
1ICMICM 
MCIMIIIIIN 
tMMISIMIIK 
MCMHItTIM ' 
. c in t i iN i 
IIICMMl 10 f tMl 
IMKCIIMM 
( M i m t i 
MSHM MOIIOHO 
OT Ct OHMIW 
a oisntT FM 
s i t u or 
tMirwrt 
CMSMMKC or 
IMM It MM: K i l l 
MMftCIMC. HUH. 
MOlf ICttIN Of 
' i M i n c n MTSIOC 
related with a test or calibration 
- 2b -
awe or 
! 
Start 
•e ekeagee. «wmts ar 
favlta la tbe teckni-
eal eyeten interfere 
wltneaereter'e on-
going taakT 
Re 
J t t , 
•e alera. signal, 
netac ate. call 
far eaemter 
activity? 
irr* levant eeanaa 
ar eventa elatract 
operator fren M l 
•tetracttan tw 
•reten 
Tea 
fr*ff*ft 
te people in tke »ra-
ten detract op'e 
attentlan fren en-
gelng taakT 
i 
No 
r 
Doee ckeago in aee-
tea etate or taak 
planning !••* *o 
eaceeelve taak 
ae**n«? 
i 
Ho 
t 
Tea 
P M « M p t n t w r / 
ejatranant far new 
activity 
Esceaaive anyalcal 
* % 
Cttawee In taak 
call far emcee-
alve 
- nappaet tine 
- aawHil fare« 
«la-
trecte an. vltn 
eletwrblng aeaaan 
toretten, tal' 
call. etc. 
alatractlon fr 
"*• etker æraen 
Chaagca ar aaatri-
catlana call rar 
Internatten vntek 
kno not keen elven/ 
Is not available 
to operator 
T 
Operator incapacitate« 
by acute cauae: t i l -
neao, in jury.etc .? 
Tts Operator 
incapacitated 
No external cauae 
Tea 
State infomation 
inadequate, wrong 
Sackgrouna tnferaatlon 
lnadeauate, wrong 
Not stated, not applicable 
Other, specify: 
Figure 2.3: Guide for using the category: Causes of Human Malfunction 
- 26 -
Call far operator i«t*rv«atl«a 
I 
ayaratar rvalti 
tmr activity* 
|VM. 
fatoctlaa aiwi«( 
I* uw activity relate« 
to Ik* art—t fwactlaaal 
•tat* ar taa m 
A » la—tlflcatl«* aat 
VIII UH tat* OH 
aarfaraa anus tk> 
ta lat i tat atatoT 
Taa, tua 
a*l*cta 
la aw • ! • • • • « • ar 
•laaawtary acta 
carractly d m w far 
t>w tNtanaaa taafc? 
Ta*. tit* m w » n af 
acta la yraytrly 
central!«* 
at« 
*Tffffffff • • •' 
.X Co—amotion la «i Art tft* latlvlaaal I r fff—Ff * • • ' 
act, orrwctl, „rfaraUT ^ > . . . ^
 K | | w 1 M | - M i 
Figure 2.4; Guide for using the category: Internal Human 
Malfunction 
- 27 -
PSYCHOLOGICAL HECHAMSH OF HUHAM HALFUMCTIOM 
Start 
1 M situation la • 
routine situation 
far which Ota aper-
atar has highly 
iafcille« ramtlnoa? 
•ut the operator 
executes • akt11a« 
act inappropri-
ately 
ttta e l tuat len devi -
ates rraai normal 
rav t i n * - does 
operator respond 
to the change? 
Taa 
The act Is not performed 
with adequate precision. 
Ulme. fore*, »patlal .accuracy: 
Tha act la performed at wrong 
place, component In spite of 
proper Intention 
Stereotype 
fixation 
Does other highly skilled 
act or activity Interfere 
with task? 
Tea 
Manual 
variability 
Topographic 
mlsoricn-
tatlon 
Stereotype 
take-over 
Tea. out f a l l s 
during execution 
Operator realises and 
responds to changes 
la the el tuat lon 
coeer— ay normal 
procedures? 
Doea operator 
rea l ise this? 
T 
Tea 
F — l l l a r patter 
not recognised 
Does operator 
respond to pro 
per t as*-de-
f ining informa-
tion? 
Us. Does operator 
recall proce-
dure correctly? No 
Korset« »so 
lated act 
HI stakes. 
alterna-
tives 
Other slip 
of memory 
The altuatlon la 
umlaut, unknown and 
call for op's func-
tional analysis and 
planning. Does op. 
realise this? 
Operator responds 
to faailtar cue 
which is incom-
plete part of 
available infor-
mation 
Familiar 
y«", association 
short cut 
Tcs 
Dees the operator 
correctly col lect the 
tnfonaatton aval l a b * 
for his analysis 
T Yes 
Are functional anely< 
sis and deduction 
properly performed ? 
T 
Information not seen or sought 
Information assumed, not observed 
information misinterpreted 
Side effects or conditions 
not adequately considered 
Tes 
Other, specify 
Figure 2.5: Guide for using the category: 
Psychological Mechanism of Human Malfunction 
- 28 -
FACTORS SHAPING PEgFOMIANCE 
Mental load. resources 
l a the occurrence of the event affected by fea-
ture« of the part icular work s i tuat ion which 
deviate froa normal practice or condition« gene-
r a l l y accepted for auch teak«? 
Not applicable 
If ye«, consider all the following questions: 
l a the design o f the Interface inappropriate 
compared with generally accepted design«? Has i t 
been considered, during the event analysis, to 
modification«? 
Next: 
Have factor« related to task planning, auch as 
several concurrent tasks, influence« the event? 
Has i t been considered, during the event analysis, 
to Modify procedures for task planning and 
scheduling? 
Next: 
Has the event been influenced by less than 
adequate t ra in ing and instructions when compared 
with the general , accepted level of training and 
Instruction? Haa Improvement of Instruction« and 
t ra in ing for the part icular task be considered? 
Next: 
Ha« the general professional background been 
appropriate for the taak? Has another task allo-
cation been dlacusaed during the event analysis? 
Next: 
Other, apeclfy: 
fee. Inadequate ergonomlc design 
res . Overlapping tasks 
J&L Inadequate general 
task training and Instruction 
Ye«
 > Inadequate general education 
Figure 2.6: Guide for using the category: 
Factors Shaping Performance, Mental Load, 
Resources 
- 29 - / 3 , 
SITUATION foctoas; 
TaSK CH—aCTWISTICS 
'MtraatWICS«-
Had tha task baan performed so frequently by th« operator 
Involved that ha could be expected to do i t without need for 
special planning or Modification o f procedures or of normal 
work practice? . 
Could the necessary 
apaclal planning ba 
dont in advance o f 
task performance, 
e . g . , was the task 
i n i t i a t e d according 
to a t iae schedule? 
.No 
Had the necessary 
special planning to 
be done concurrently 
wi th task perfor-
mance, e.g., because 
the task was un-
expectedly celled 
for by the system or 
by special order? 
No 
No 
Tea, Unfamiliar task 
on schedule 
Yest Unfamiliar task 
on demand 
T Tea 
Could rehearsal of 
existing procedures 
or work practice be 
done in advance of 
taak performance, 
e . g . . was the task 
i n i l i s t e d according 
to a time schedule? 
Tes Familiar task 
on schedule 
No 
Was rehearsal of 
procedures or work 
practice impossible 
in advance of task 
performance, e.g.. 
because the task wss 
unexpectedly celled 
for by the system or 
by special order? 
y » , familiar taak 
on demand 
No 
Not ststed, not spplicsble 
Figure 2 .7 : Guide f o r using the category: S i tua t ion Factors, Task 
Charac te r i s t i cs , "Preparedness". 
- 31 -
3. WORK ANALYSIS: PRE-IDENTIFICATION OF HUMAN RISK 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN SCHEDULED, FAMILIAR TASKS 
In section 2 the use of the description system for post-in-
cident analysis has been described. Post-incident analysis 
implies a breakdown of the incident into the features given by 
the description system of Appendix A, and the quality of the 
system is related to the extent to which the causal flow and 
the mechanisms controlling the event propagation are maintained 
and can be regenerated from the data. When used for pre-iden-
tification of errors, the description system must serve a 
synthesis of relevant, possible chains of events due to human 
malfunction utilizing the descriptors contained in the 
categories together with a ranking of the significance of the 
possible events. 
The method: Work Analysis (WA), presented in subsection 3.1., 
is, in its present form, intended for supporting the design of 
scheduled, familiar tasks and the improvement of existing tasks 
and for providing documentation of risk-related intentions in 
task design and modifications. 
The WA has been developed with the intention of serving the 
integrated PRA/RM concept mentioned in section 1. The appli-
cation of WA to this purpose is treated in subsection 3.2. at a 
rather general level describing how the method should be 
incorporated in the procedure of providing a PRA. Finally, 
suusection 3.3. presents some preconditions necessary for 
quantified prediction. 
3.1. Work Analysis Applied to Task Design and Improvement 
Work analysis is intended for the pre-identification and 
counteraction of errors in scheduled, familiar tasks with 
unchangeable procedure, i.e. errors owing to "normal human 
variability" in skill- and rule-based activities. 
However, more detailed and precise criteria are wanted for 
guiding the decision as to whether a given task design is 
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accessible to formal analysis. For the present state of the art 
this lack of criteria can to some extent be compensated for by 
careful recording, during the WA, of everything met with which 
constitutes a necessary condition for the analysis to be valid. 
This will also support a delimitation of the task to be 
analysed relative to adjoining activities to be omitted and 
therefore to be taken care of otherwise. 
A rule-based task supported by written instruction is likely to 
develop into a task totally skill-based and with its instruc-
tion recalled by heart: This should be foreseen in task design 
by providing error recovery possibilities also covering this 
change in level of behaviour and followed up by observation of 
actual task performance and feedback of experience. Also, for 
the purpose of error detection, it may be important to maintain 
knowledge, even though high skill is developed, as discussed in 
subsection A.2. 
Tasks which are not suited for WA could be treated in one or more 
of the following ways: 
- By converting the task to a technical activity, e.g. by 
automation, with predictable risk contribution and sup-
plemented by human maintenance activities covered by WA. 
- Administrative precautions against errors to be established 
during task performance, the efficiency of these precautions 
to be controlled by RM utilizing feedback of experience. 
- By securing that the error effects are reversible and subject 
to predictable error detection and correction functions. 
3.2. Overview 
Identification of the possibilities of human malfunction in a 
task considered in isolation is not very meaningful. The basis 
for any human error identification in the present context will 
be the results of a functional analysis of the technical system 
or the task environment including a technical failure analysis. 
This analysis will serve to identify the requirements for human 
involvement and to specify these requirements in terms of 
plant-oriented activities and involved components required to 
- 33 -
bring the technical system from one state to another. The term 
"task" is designated to this set of activities and components. 
Also, the technical failure analysis, in case of attempting 
quantified prediction, could provide probability estimates for 
the relevant equipment failures and other not human-caused 
events, such estimates will be very useful to serve as stop 
rules to prevent unnecessary deep search for human error 
mechanisms. 
When the task requirements have been formulated in plant-
-oriented terms they should be connected with the description 
system for human malfunctions as indicated in Fig. 3.1. The 
problem now is to describe the activities in human-oriented 
terms, i.e. to determine for each activity which "internal 
mental function" is required by the activity and could be 
wrong. Or it may be necessary to further subdivide the activity 
until application of this category is possible. 
Next, candidate "psychological mechanisms" are postulated for 
leading to erroneous "mental function", the selection of 
candidate mechanisms can be supported by postulating "external 
causes" and "human factors" influences specific for the given 
task and its circumstances. The effect of the erroneous mental 
function upon the activity performance can then be determined 
in detail, leading to identification of relevant "external 
modes of error". Finally, the related specific fault trees can 
be constructed. 
Example: If we consider as a simple example the activity of 
closing a valve, this can be unsuccessful due to 
different "psychological mechanisms". It may be opened 
fully instead of closed due to "mistake of alterna-
tives" or due to "stereotype fixation" (if its oper-
ation appears in reverse to usual). Closing may be 
omitted due to simple "slip of memory", the omission 
being more likely if the activity is "functionally 
isolated" from the main course of the task. Or a wrong 
valve may be closed, in which case we have two error 
effects, perhaps with coupling between them, and it is 
important to predict the mistaken valve. Depending 
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upon the mechanism involved, this valve may be topo-
graphically close ("topographic misorientation"), have 
a name or label which can be mistaken ("mistake of 
alternatives", A for B for instance) or be part of a 
very familiar routine which is similar to the present 
activity (psychologically close, "stereotype take— 
over"). The message of this simple example is that, by 
postulating this human-oriented error chain, the 
causal relationship among mechanisms, mental function 
and task elements must be maintained when identifying 
the external mode of error in order to make possib? e 
the incorporation of the method into probabilistic 
risk prediction where the conservation of causality is 
a necessity. 
When the effect of the errors and the potential for error 
recovery are identified in subsequent analysis, the candidate 
causes of errors are evaluated for their significance for lack 
of task result and for coupling to other events, and finally a 
quantified assessment may be attempted if needed. 
Based on the description system general formats can be devel-
oped in order to aid the systematic identification of relevant 
human error chains and also for providing documentation of the 
analyst's search. Example formats are given in Figures 3.2 and 
3.3. 
3.3. Detailed Procedure 
WA is analysis of reliability and immediate risk from perform-
ance in a familiar, well trained task which is part of a 
planned work schedule. This means: the goal or target of the 
activity is generally accepted; the cues to start of the task 
are known and, therefore, no errors of intention are consider-
ed. 
The analyst should presume the existence of Risk Management 
with experience fed back from post-incident analysis and also 
should, during the entire analysis, record, when found, assump-
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tions and preconditions to be fulfilled for the analysis and 
its results to be valid and to remain valid. 
Also recorded should be cases where postulated data or in-
formation have to be used in order to have the analysis carried 
through in spite of lacking data or information. 
a. Analysis of Task Sequence 
Use instructions and manuals as well as interviews and obser-
vations. 
a.l. Define a sequence of- phases or subtasks which is deter-
mined by functional requirements of the system and which 
cannot be modified without interrupting the task. 
a.2. Define the necessary acts of the different alternative, 
functionally acceptable action sequences for each subtask, 
(i.e., also possible short-cuts, tricks of the trade, 
which lead to an acceptable result). 
Example: Alternative sequence 
b. Analysis of Task Reliability 
b.l. Define acceptance criteria for task result. (Criteria for 
task process are related to analysis of risk). 
b.2. Define error recovery points; i.e., define points in the 
sequence in which previously committed errors will be 
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immediately observable and reversible - either directly 
observable or because task sequence is interrupted as a 
consequence of the error, making subsequent action diffi-
cult. (Such recovery points may correspond to links 
between subtasks of a.l.). 
Error recovery paths found: RA, RB, RC. 
b.3. Define those acts or action sequences for which the 
influence on task result is not covered by error detection 
and recovery; i.e., errors will not be observable and 
reversible. 
b.4. For these acts, identify the human error modes which will 
lead to uncorrected, unacceptable task result. 
Individual acts 
This error-mode-and-effect analysis can be performed by pos-
tulating errors in terms of external acts only or by also 
including postulated psychological error mechanisms, i . e . by 
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involving the human malfunction description system as indicated 
in Figure 3.1. 
The first type of analysis is the simplest; however, in risk 
analysis the latter is preferable. 
The example formats of Figures 3.2 and 3.3 could support 
postulation and documentation of the errors found relevant. 
The formats are applied to each individual act, one sheet of 
the format showing those action errors and the corresponding 
mechanisms found relevant for a particular act. 
b.S. Evaluate conditions for error detection and correction at 
the states found in b.2. Define error modes which will 
cause unsuccessful error recovery. 
b.6. Apply human error rate estimates to evaluate total task 
reliability, considering errors and modes found in b.4. 
and b.5. 
For b.5., as an example: 
If error probability for the string 6 to 7 is 1/10 and for 
RC 1/10, then the resulting error probability in obtaining 
state 7 from state 6 is 1/10 x 1/10 = 1/100. 
b.7. Judge whether the reliability of the error recovery at the 
recovery points of b.2. is in fact sufficiently high to 
ignore errors in the preceding sequence. 
If not, repeat b.3. for these sequences. 
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Are RA, RB, and RC enough r e l i a b l e ? 
I f not : Neglect those RX considered u n r e l i a b l e . For the 
corresponding non-recoverable sequences repeat b . 4 . and 
b . 6 . 
c. Analysis of Immediate Effects 
c.l. Define the topographically nearest as well as the struc-
turally and functionally connected systems which can be 
affected by erroneous human acts. 
System involved in task 
The information needed for defining the task-external 
systems should be stated. This information is not to be 
expected given in the conventional functional descrip-
tions. 
c.2. Define the set of error modes which should be used in an 
error-mode-and-effect analysis. Connect modes with psycho-
logical error mechanisms in order to be able to perform 
c.6. 
c.3. Apply this set of postulated errors for each of the steps 
in the applicable task sequences of a.2. 
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Again the formats of Figures 3.2 and 3.3 can be used. 
c.4. For each action and error mode, identify possible unac-
ceptable effects on the system worked on, as well as those 
systems identified in c.l. 
c.5. Judge possibilities of error detection and recovery for each 
relevant error mode from c.4. (These possibilities are, gen-
erally, different from those under b.5.). 
rw*wp^ 
c.6. Evaluate the significance of the possible simultaneous 
presence of an erroneous act and an unacceptable task 
result, i.e. a possible, systematic coupling between two 
abnormal chains of events. 
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c.7. Categorize unacceptable effects found by c.4. and c.6. in 
relation to the overall risk analysis as given in the 
Cause Consequence Charts. 
c.8. Apply human error estimates for the significant contribu-
tors in c.4. and c.6. 
d. Analysis of Task Disturbances 
Task disturbances may lead the performer to re-evaluate the 
task conditions. This may result in decisions which, if 
erroneous, may give human "errors of intention". 
d.l. Evaluate sources of disturbances. Define the categories to 
be analysed in an explicit way. Formulate assumptions in 
order to facilitate "risk management" of those assumptions 
not included in the analysis. 
Examples of typical sources of disturbances: 
- personnel/work planning and scheduling 
- tools/equipment; materials, spareparts 
- latent, faulty conditions in system worked on. 
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d.2. Identify for each of the task steps not covered by error 
recovery and for the error recovery path, the possible 
lack/degradation of planning/tools/material/information 
which will affect task conditions. 
d.3. Identify the normal, typical, easy alternative replace-
ments or improvisations of the particular profession and 
work setting. 
d.4. For the improvised task sequences identified in d.3., 
repeat analysis under a., b., and c. If effects are 
unacceptable and conditions too unstructured for analysis, 
modify system or specify risk management. 
3.4. Work Analysis Utilised in PRA 
As explained in section 1 WA is developed in order to satisfy 
the requirements to be demanded if the method efficiently 
should fit into the integrated PRA/RM concept. These require-
ments are discussed in ref. 1, and so is the incorporation of 
WA into an overall plant PRA. 
The following general procedure is assumed for the incor-
poration of WA into an overall plant PRA: 
Firstly, a basic PRA is performed for the plant technical 
systems and for those human activities which are contained in 
the formalized and instructed operator tasks, i.e. such human 
activities have been subject to Work Analysis covering the 
human reliability and the immediate risk from human errors 
during performance of formally instructed activities. A set of 
criteria must be established to guide the decision as to 
whether a given task design is acceptable for formal analysis 
and it is assumed that identification of necessary human 
activities not corresponding to such criteria will lead to 
modification of the system design. In our view, with the 
present state of the art, only scheduled, familiar tasks are 
considered to be accessible to formal analysis. Fig. 3.4 gives 
an overview of the content of a WA and its relationships to the 
cause-seeking strategy of risk analysis. The failure analysis 
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of the technical systens should provide probability estimates 
for the relevant equipment failures and other events not caused 
by humans, such estimates will be very useful by serving as 
stop rules to prevent unnecessary deep search for human errors. 
Secondly, as a supplement to the basic PRA, an analysis is 
performed of the possible modifications of the PRA content 
owing to errors during human activities in general. Important 
types of human interferences are those that will 
- affect the frequency of event chains, 
- change the structure of event trees by breaking the recovery 
paths representing protective functions, 
- introduce couplings between otherwise independent events. 
Search strategies for the identification of such interferences 
still have to be developed, proposals are given in ref. 1, 
where also are discussed the properties of the risk analysis to 
be required for the PRA/RM concept to be efficient. 
3.5. Quantification of Human Risk Contributions 
The concise statements from ref. 4 are still valid as criteria 
for meaningful quantitative human factors assessment of re-
liability and safety and hence are quoted in the following: 
Properties characterizing the 
human as part of a system: 
- Man is adaptive and able to learn and therefore may in-
appropriately respecify a function or a task. 
- Man may be occupied by several tasks simultaneously. 
- Man may respond to total situations rather than to individual 
events or system states. 
- Man is influenced by factors badly defined and difficult to 
quantify, such as motivation, stress, fatigue, etc. 
- Several different internal mental functions of man can serve 
the same external function, depending on his training and 
skill, prior experiences, subjective criteria etc. 
- Man is capable of selfmonitoring and error correction. 
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Conditions for reliability analysis 
including human malfunctions: 
Reliability is defined as the ability to maintain a specified, 
wanted function. Quantification leads to figures describing the 
probability that a specified wanted function will be performed 
e.g. during a given time. 
Due to the particular properties of man mentioned above a 
systematic analysis and quantification of system reliability is 
not feasible unless the design of the system and the work 
situation of its operators satisfy some general conditions. 
Necessary conditions for the use of probabilistic methods to 
predict the probability that a specified task is performed 
satisfactorily by human operators are: 
- There is no significant contribution from systematic errors 
due to man's inappropriate redefinition of task, interference 
from other tasks or activities, etc.; 
and 
- The task can be broken down to a predictable sequence of 
separate subtasks at a level where failure data can be 
obtained from similar work situations, i.e. the task is 
performed in the rule-based behavioural domain 
and 
- These independent subtasks are cued individually by the 
system or by other external means, so that modification of 
procedure does not take place; 
or: 
- If these conditions are not satisfied, e.g. because the task 
is performed as one integrated whole, or it is performed by 
complex and variable human functions such as higher level 
cognitive functions, then the effect of errors in the task 
must be reversible and subject to an error detection and 
correction function, which in turn satisfies the above-men-
tioned conditions for predictability. A lower bound on the 
total reliability can then be derived from the frequency of 
opportunities for error and the reliability of the error-cor-
recting function. 
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Conditions for safety analysis 
including human malfunctions: 
Safety is defined as the ability to prevent losses in con-
sequence of accidental maloperation not only due to the absence 
of wanted functions but also due to the occurrence of un-
wanted/unexpected, particularly human, functions and to combi-
nations of these types of functions. 
Again, due to the properties of man, a systematic analysis and 
quantification of specific consequences of accidental events in 
a system can only be quantified if: 
- it can be demonstrated that the effects of erroneous human 
acts are not significant contributors to the probability, if 
necessary by introduction of interlocks or barriers which 
prevent human interaction, 
or 
- the effects of erroneous human acts are reversible and 
detectable by a monitoring or safety function which can be 
performed by operators or automatically. 
If the reliability of such barriers and safety functions can 
be quantified then an upper bound of the probability of the 
event in question can be derived from the frequency of error 
opportunities. 
- 45 -
Figure 3.1: Application to Work 
Analysis of the description 
system for human malfunctions 
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Figure 3.3: Systematic postulation of relevant errors: Example 
format. For illustrative purpose, only limited numbers of 
items in the different categories are included. 
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Figure 3.4: Illustrates the difference between the search 
strategies applied in Work Analysis: with starting point 
in normal work sequences and seeking for the effects of 
errors, and in Risk Analysis: with starting point in a 
critical event seeking for its possible causes among tech-
nical failures and human activities and errors. 
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APPENDIX A: The Description System for Human Malfunctions 
A.l. Outlines of Description Categories 
The description system used in common for the predictive 
analysis and the post-incident analysis is shown in principle 
in Figure A.l, referred to in the following. 
The box "personnel task" is representing the description of the 
task in question, e.g. an operational task, and is in terms of 
the human interactions with the technical system, e.g. as given 
by a written instruction. Each step of the detailed task 
description, e.g. "press button", corresponds with a descriptor 
in the box "internal human malfunction". The descriptors of 
this box are in generic human-oriented terms not specific for 
the task considered and should answer the question: which kind 
of internal mental function did fail? 
Each step of the task description also determines how the 
erroneous performance of this step can manifest itself as an 
observable external effect as given by the descriptors in the 
box "external mode of malfunction". 
It should be noticed that the contents of "internal human mal-
function" have been developed particularly for control room 
operator activities and could be modified for better coverage 
of other task types. Similarly, the contents of "external mode" 
could be extended and/or adapted to specific task types. 
The category "psychological mechanisms'* describes the psy-
chological error mechanisms which influenced that internal 
mental function which was inappropriately performed. The de-
scriptors have been found to cover the larger part of the more 
simple cases, however, could be expected supplemented with 
further mechanisms found by post-incident application of the 
description system. 
The box "causes of human malfunction" describes causes of the 
initiation of the psychological mechanism whether external or 
attributed to the human. Again the contents should be consider-
ed an example and adaptable to specific applications. 
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More general influences upon the task are covered by the 
descriptors in "factors affecting performance" and "situation 
factors", since they do not themselves release a chain of 
events but modify the probability of having a chain released by 
other causal events. 
The important properties of the description system are that the 
four categories in the lower part of Figure A.l enables the 
analyst 
- in post-incident analysis to identify a causally ordered 
chain of descriptors connecting an external cause of the 
human malfunction with- an external manifestation of the 
effect of the malfunction through two human-oriented de-
scriptors of a general, not task-specific, kind, 
- in predictive analysis to postulate relevant causally-ordered 
chains of the same kind as above and to generate relevant 
scenaria, 
- to have the chain of descriptors connected with a conven-
tional task description given in equipment-oriented terms. 
Condensed flow-graph guidelines for use of the categories in 
post-incident analysis are given in section 2: 
Causes of malfunction: Fig. 2.3 
Psychological mechanisms: Fig. 2.5 
Internal malfunction: Fig. 2.4 
Situation factors, task characteristics, "preparedness": Fig. 
2.7 
Factors shaping performance, mental load, resources: Fig. 
2.6. 
The guides are intended particularly for control room ac-
tivities, however, can be applied to other activities. 
In the following are described in detail the two categories 
particularly human-oriented: Psychological mechanisms and 
internal malfunctions and also their underlying models. 
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A.2. Category: Psychological Error Mechanises, 
and the "3-Level Model" 
The category represents an attempt to foraulate a set of 
generic, task independent hunan error mechanisms. To evaluate 
hunan performance during design of new tasks and for the 
improvement of existing work conditions, including man-machine 
interfaces, it is important to identify human malfunction 
mechanisms in generic terms relating inappropriate task per-
formance to features of those psychological mechanisms which 
are the basis of the performance and to mechanism properties 
putting limits to performance. 
A human is capable of performing the same task in various 
different ways depending upon the state of training, the 
subjective formulation of the goals and performance criteria, 
and consequently the role of the psychological mechanisms will 
be very dependent on person and situation. Inappropriate task 
performance reflects a mismatch between task requirements and 
the human resources applied, and if the nature of this mismatch 
can be identified - irrespectively of the underlying cause -
important information on the psychological mechanism applied 
and its limiting properties with respect to the task can be 
obtained. 
The present category is intended to characterize cases of such 
resource/demand mismatch and is based on a model of operator 
performance derived from a preliminary analysis of 200 Licensee 
Event Reports (ref. 2). The structure of the model is illus-
trated in Figure A.2. 
Referring to Fig. A.2, human behaviour is considered subject to 
three different levels of control, the levels of skill-, rule-, 
and knowledge-based behaviour. 
Skill-, rule- and knowledge-based behaviour are not alternative 
human processes; they are types of behavioural control which 
are probably all active at all times: Knowledge-based behaviour 
may comprise as ingredients also rule- and skill-based behav-
iour and rule-based behaviour may comprise skilled activities. 
During familiar work situations, when a rule-based activity is 
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controlled by know-how and automated subroutines, the conscious 
mind has time left for other business, which may be to plan the 
future, to monitor the effects of past activities, or to 
speculate on private troubles. The degree to which people tend 
to use knowledge-based functional reasoning to monitor their 
activities during familiar work situations probably depends 
very much on one's individual disposition, but the opportunity 
to do so certainly also depends on the man-task interface 
design. 
The ski11-based behaviour represents sensori-motor performance 
during acts or activities which, following a statement of an 
intention, take place without conscious control as smooth, 
automated and highly integrated patterns of behaviour. 
At the ski 11-based level the perceptual-motor system acts as a 
multivariable, continuous control system synchronizing the 
physical activity such as navigating the body through the 
environment and manipulating external objects in a time-space 
domain. For this control the information is perceived as 
time-space signals, continuous, quantitative indicators of the 
time-space behaviour of the environment. These signals have no 
"meaning" or significance except as direct physical time-space 
data. The performance at the skill-based level may be released 
or guided by value features attached by prior experience to 
certain patterns in the information, these patterns not taking 
part in the time-space control but acting as cues or signs 
activating the organism. Performance is based upon a very 
flexible and efficient dynamic internal world model. 
At the next level of rule-based behaviour, the composition of a 
sequence of subroutines in a familiar work situation is 
typically controlled by a stored rule or procedure which may 
have been derived empirically during previous occasions, com-
municated from other persons' know-how as an instruction or 
cookbook recipe, or it may be prepared on occasion by conscious 
problem solving and planning. The point is here that perform-
ance is goal-oriented, but structured by "feedforward control" 
through a stored rule. Very often, the goal is not even 
explicitly formulated, but is found implicitly in the situation 
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releasing the stored rules. The rule or control is selected 
fro« previous successful experiences and evolves by "survival 
of the fittest" rule. Furthermore, in actual life, the goal 
will only be reached after a long sequence of acts, and direct 
feedback correction considering the goal may not be possible. 
At the rule-based level, the information is typically perceived 
as signs. 
During unfamiliar situations, for which no know-how or rules 
for control are available from previous encounters, the control 
of performance must move to a higher conceptual level, in which 
performance is goal-control led, and knowledge-based. In this 
situation, the goal is explicitly formulated, based on an 
analysis of the environment and the overall aims of the person. 
Then a useful plan is developed - by selection, such that 
different plans are considered and their effect tested against 
the goal, physically by trial and error, or conceptually by 
means of understanding of the functional properties of the 
environment and prediction of the effects of the plan consider-
ed. At this level of functional reasoning, the internal 
structure of the system is explicitly represented by a "mental 
model" which may take several different forms. To be useful for 
causal functional reasoning in order to predict or explain 
unfamiliar behaviour of the environment, information must be 
perceived as symbols. 
During training in a particular task, control moves from the 
knowledge- or rule-based levels towards the skill-based con-
trol, as familiarity with the work scenarios is developed. An 
important point is that it is not the control processes of the 
higher levels that are automated. Automated manual skills are 
developing while they are controlled and supervised at the 
higher levels. When explicit knowledge or rules are no longer 
needed for behavioural control during normal work, they will 
eventually deteriorate. With respect to error observability, it 
is a problem at the skill- and rule-based levels that the goals 
are not explicitly controlling the activity. This means that 
errors during performance may only be evident at a very late 
stage - an error in the use of a recipe may not manifest itself 
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until you taste the cake, i.e. when the product is present. 
Early detection of the effect of one's own variability (or of 
changes in system conditions) depends on an ability to monitor 
the process, i.e. on knowledge-based monitoring based on under-
standing of the underlying processes. For error detection it 
may therefore be important to maintain knowledge, even though 
high skill is developed. 
In Fig. A. 2 is indicated how the psychological error mechanisms 
are associated with the 3-level model and in the next paragraph 
the mechanisms will be explained in detail. 
A.3. Descriptors of the Category: Psychological 
Error Mechanisms 
DISCRIMINATION 
This group is related to the man's ability to discriminate 
between levels of control needed for his activities and select 
the proper level for each activity. The subcategories of 
mechanisms are characterized by interference between the man's 
repertoire of stereotyped habitual - and often subconscious -
responses on one side and on the other side aspects of the 
actual work situation during infrequent and unique task 
demands. 
Stereotype (skill) fixation: Man operates in ski11-based do-
main. He does not recognize a situation calling for attention 
and caution. (Cues for recognition may not be present or may be 
overlooked, this is characterized by the categories: Cause of 
Human Malfunction or Internal Human Malfunction). 
Stereotype fixation represents the situation when a skill-based 
activity is activated or continued in an improper context, and 
the person on afterthought very well knows what he should have 
done. He does not switch to proper rule-based control. 
Examples: - An operator presses air out of a plastic bag 
containing dust in order to seal it, although he 
knows it contains radioactive material. He gets 
contaminated in the face. 
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- During a clean-up operation in a radioactive area, 
a vacuum cleaner fails. A foreman opens it for a 
possible rapid repair, despite the fact that he 
knows it contains radioactive dust. 
In both cases, normal everyday reactions are carried 
over to a special context. Also this appears to be a 
reasonable and effective learning mechanism - in a 
reversible context. Here the invisible radioactivity 
makes the environment "unkind". 
Familiar association short-cut: It is recognized that conscious 
identification of the situation is needed but familiar cues 
activate incorrect intention and task in man. It is not 
recognized that knowledge-based evaluation and planning is 
needed. Transfer from rule- to knowledge-based control is 
impeded. 
There is a considerable probability of highly skilled operators 
with a large repertoire of convenient signs and related 
know-how not switching to analytical reasoning when required, 
if they find a familiar subset of data during their reading of 
instruments. They will rather run into a "procedural trap" and 
be caught by "familiar association short-cut" very probably 
based on a subset of the available data. Examples from major 
industrial incidents are numerous. 
Stereotype take-over: Task or act according to proper inten-
tion, but "absentmindedness" during performance leads to re-
lapse to stereotype action links related to different act or 
task. 
A single conscious statement of intention may activate a proper 
familiar schema, whereafter the attention may be directed e.g. 
towards planning of future activities or monitoring the past. 
The current, unmonitored schema will then be sensitive to 
interference leading to "stereotype take-over", i.e. another 
schema takes over the control, either because a part of current 
action sequence is also part of another frequently used schema, 
or due to interfering intentions of the detached attention, 
i.e. transfer from a skill-based to a different inappropriate 
skill-based activity takes place. 
- 56 -
Examples: - During normal operation of a process plant the 
power supply to the instrumentation disappears. 
Investigation reveals that the manual main circuit 
breaker in the power supply is in the off position. 
The conclusion was that a roving operator, checking 
cooling towers and pumps, inadvertently had swtich-
ed from a routine check-round to the Friday after-
noon shutdown check-round and turned off the sup-
ply. The routes of the two check-rounds are the 
same, except that he is supposed to pass by the 
door of the generator room on the routine check, 
but to enter and turn off the supply on the 
shutdown checks. Something on the way obviously 
had conditioned him for shutdown checks (sunshine 
and day dreams?). The operator was not aware of his 
action, but did not reject the explanation. 
Lack of recognition of familiar patterns: Familiar pattern rel-
evant for the situation is not recognized, higher level 
knowledge-based evaluation or planning is unnecessarily and 
inappropriately applied. 
INPUT INFORMATION PROCESSING 
The subcategories are related to the man's activities in 
obtaining information. (That an information malfunction has 
occurred is classified under: Internal Human Malfunction, 
erroneous function in action, communication given incorrectly). 
Information not received/sought: Cues do not activate man 
because sensitivity/attention is insufficient for present 
information level. 
Misinterpretation of information: Response is based on wrong 
apprehension of information such as misreading of text or 
instrument, misunderstanding of verbal message. 
Assumptions replace search for information: Response is in-
appropriately based on information supplied by the operator (by 
recall, guesses, etc.) which does not correspond with infor-
mation available from outside. 
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RECALL 
Forgetting isolated itea, act or function: Operator forgets to 
perfom an isolated item, act or function, i.e. an act or 
function which is not cued by the functional context or is not 
having imnediate influence upon the mental or motor sequence, 
or an item which is not an integrated part of a larger memory 
structure. 
Mistake among alternatives: Simple choice of wrong alternative, 
a category is correctly used but by wrong member, e.g. mistakes 
of up/down, +/-, left/right, A/B, open/closed, locked/unlocked. 
Examples: - Using positive correction factors instead of nega-
tive; using increasing instead of decreasing signal 
in calibration. 
- Disconnect pump A instead of B. 
Other slips of memory: Erroneous recall of reference data 
values; names, item; need for actions, etc. 
INFERENCES 
This group is covering problems of linear thought in causal 
nets. 
In present day control rooms based on individual presentation 
of the measured variables, the context in which operators make 
decisions at the knowledge-based level is far too unstructured 
to allow the development of a model of their problem-solving 
process, and hence, to identify typical "error" modes, except 
in very general terms, such as "lack of consideration in latent 
conditions or side effects" (ref. 2). 
Side effects or latent conditions not adequately considered: 
The man is in a less familiar situation characterized by 
knowledge-based, goal-controlled performance. He performs er-
roneously during functional inferences: The situation is not 
properly identified, the consequences of an event chain are not 
adequately predicted or an improper intention is chosen or 
latent conditions are not adequately considered. Consequently, 
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the task or the intended goal is not fulfilled or adverse side 
effects occur or a combination of these consequences. (Can be 
due to oversight, lack of knowledge etc., this is characterized 
by the category: Cause of human malfunction). 
PHYSICAL COORDINATION 
Motor variability: Lack of manual precision, too big/small 
force applied, inappropriate timing. Including deviations from 
"good craftmanship". 
Examples: - Inadequate precision leads to short-circuit of 
terminals with screw-driver. 
- Inadequate precision in replacement of relay cover 
leads to short-circuit of relay terminals. 
- Varying use of force in manipulating a bank of 
valves occasionally leaves a valve leaking. 
Topographic, spatial orientation inadequate: In spite of man's 
correct intention and his correct recall of identification 
marks, tagging etc., he unawaringly performs task/act in the 
wrong place or on the wrong object, because he is following his 
immediate sense of locality, this, however, not being appli-
cable (not updated, surviving imprints of old habits etc.). 
Examples: - A failure in one of several pump trains in the 
basement leads to the decision in the control room 
to switch off the "north train". However, during 
passage down stairs an operator looses orientation 
and switches off the southern train, even though he 
has the proper intention. 
A.4. Category: Internal Human Malfunction, and 
the "Decision Ladder" Model 
Ideally, the design of man-machine interface systems, particu-
larly those utilizing modern information technology, should be 
based on a generic model of the information processes implied 
in the decisions to be taken by the control system including 
humans. To be generally applicable this model must be expressed 
in terms independent of the specific system and its immediate 
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control requirements. Unfortunately, such a generic model of 
the information processes implied does not exist. 
The well-defined and well-structured nature of industrial 
process systems seems to be reflected in the supervisory 
control decisions in such systems: Studies of the activities in 
control rooms of fossil fueled power plants have led to the 
suggestion of a normative model in the form of a causally 
ordered sequence of necessary decision steps ("decision 
ladder") as shown in Fig. A.3: 
First, the decision maker has to detect the need for his 
intervention and he has to look around and to observe some 
important data to have direction for subsequent activities. He 
then has to analyze the evidence available in order to identify 
the present state of affairs, and to evaluate their possible 
consequences with reference to the established operational 
goals and company policies. Based on the evaluation, a target 
state into which the system should be transferred is chosen, 
and the task which the decision maker has to perform is 
selected from a review of the resources he has available to 
reach the target state. When the task has thus been identified, 
the proper procedure, how to do it, must be planned and 
executed. 
The nature of the information processes changes during the 
sequence. In the beginning it is an analysis of the situation 
to identify the problem, then a prediction and value judgement 
and, finally, a selection and planning of the proper control 
actions. 
In Fig. A.3 is shown how in practice stereotyped processes can 
by-pass decision steps, this leading to very efficient perform-
ance. Also indicated is the relationship between the decision 
sequence and the "3 level model" of behaviour control in Fig. 
A.2. 
It should be noticed that the breakdown of the decision task 
may result in different elementary phases if the task is 
belonging to systems not as well-defined as industrial process 
systems, e.g. social or administrative systems. 
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The "decision ladder" concept can be used on different levels 
within a given task. A repair task can be taken as an example: 
If we designate a "decision ladder" to the overall repair task 
and if the equipment failure is uncorrectly diagnosed, then the 
internal human malfunction will be erroneous "identification". 
However, if the failure is correctly identified and the task of 
replacement properly mentioned but inappropriately planned 
because the internal state of the equipment is not properly 
identified at a more detailed level, then we have the following 
case: In the overall "decision ladder" the repair man performed 
error-free until his formulation of a procedure for the repair 
activities: In order to obtain a procedure he entered a 
secondary "decision ladder" for identifying the equipment 
details to be replaced. This "identification" belonging to the 
secondary "decision ladder" was erroneously performed, i.e. the 
error is in "identification" in terms of the secondary decision 
ladder and in "procedure" in terms of the overall decision 
ladder as visualized by the following figure: 
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Figure A.2: Simplified map of three levels of control of 
human actions. The three levels are in a real situation 
interacting in a much more complex way than shown. Also 
in the map are indicated typical psychological error 
mechanisms. 
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Figure A.3: Illustrates the relationship between the decision 
ladder and the three levels of control of human behaviour. 
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without a particular human factors background. 
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analysis and for Work Analysis, which is a search strategy 
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bration, and constitutes a formalized procedure for the 
pre-identification of relevant human errors leading to a 
lack of task result and/or to immediate effects not cover-
ed by the lack of task result itself. 
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based on a common description system for human malfunction 
This system is explained in appendix and so are its under-
lying models and way of reasoning. 
Finally, a word index is provided for supporting the 
reader. 
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